Engagement and balance. That’s what new South Korean President Lee Jae-myung promises.
But this “two-handed diplomacy” draws both praise and alarm. And given the ongoing geopolitical volatility and strategic realignments in Northeast Asia, this is no small matter.
Lee seeks to sustain South Korea’s long-standing alliance with the United States and Japan while reopening diplomatic channels with North Korea and China. And you wouldn’t be wrong to think this “centrist” strategy implies contradictions and risks.
So let’s see what President Lee is doing…
Lee’s dream-team
First of all, Lee’s foreign policy is centered on a calculated orchestration of key cabinet appointments—people known for their deep experience in diplomacy, national defense, and inter-Korean relations. We can name them: Lee Jong-seok (National Intelligence Service Director), Wi Sung-rak (National Security Advisor), Chung Dong-young (Unification Minister), Cho Hyun (Foreign Minister), and Ahn Gyu-baek (Defense Minister).
This is Lee showing continuity, expertise, and equilibrium, selecting an entourage that projects seasoned pragmatism amid regional uncertainty.
However, as this cabinet takes shape, critical questions have emerged among security and foreign policy experts about its ideological orientation—for a very simple reason: these people are full of experience, but they are also associated with “progressive” policies of engagement and reconciliation, particularly toward North Korea and China.
Naturally, critics argue that their selection reduces South Korea’s deterrent posture and strategic reliability in the eyes of allies, especially at a time when China’s assertiveness and North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship continue unabated.
The thing is, President Lee’s diplomatic vision rests on dual imperatives. On one hand, he wants to revitalize inter-Korean dialogue. On the other, he wants to sustain South Korea’s alliance with the United States.
This balancing act is exemplified in his appointments. Let’s go back to our list of newly appointed VIPs. Among them, we named Chung Dong-young: he was a key figure during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and his “Sunshine Policy” of détente with North Korea. He has long championed economic cooperation and incremental trust-building with Pyongyang.
Now look at another name: Lee Jong-seok, a veteran North Korea analyst, is expected to boost the intelligence community’s understanding of North Korean intentions independently of outsiders’ views—although he too is a known proponent of engagement.
And then there is Wi Sung-rak, a former ambassador to Russia and seasoned negotiator, who is now tasked with aligning security strategy with shifting global power dynamics. Cho Hyun’s diplomatic résumé includes high-level postings to the United Nations and multilateral forums, potentially enhancing South Korea’s global voice.
And finally, Ahn Gyu-baek is known for advocating defense modernization and autonomy—a crucial stance as the regional security environment becomes more technologically complex and unpredictable.
Competent men for sure, but the strategic coherence of this team remains uncertain, because the heavy presence of officials with past involvement in North-South reconciliation and their uniform pro-China stance risks reviving the kind of policy frameworks we witnessed during the “Sunshine” era.
But those policies lost traction once that era ended. And that’s because détente with Pyongyang has repeatedly faltered in the face of North Korea’s consistent violations of international norms, including nuclear tests and cyberattacks.
Notwithstanding Trump’s smiley gestures toward Kim Jong-un, experience shows that pursuing engagement without clear conditionality emboldens Pyongyang, all while straining Seoul’s credibility with Washington and Tokyo.
Expertise vs. Ideology: A Cabinet Under Scrutiny
So: experienced people, but their shared ideological leanings raise concerns about strategic groupthink. Key officials like Lee Jong-seok and Chung Dong-young favor renewed engagement with North Korea, despite Pyongyang’s continued missile tests and rejection of denuclearization talks. Cho Hyun’s multilateral diplomacy can elevate South Korea’s global profile, but also sideline critical bilateral security ties with the U.S. and Japan. Defense nominee Ahn Gyu-baek supports self-reliant deterrence, yet his success depends on political will and alliance coordination. National Security Advisor Wi Sung-rak’s ties to Moscow also complicate Seoul’s position amid rising tensions with Russia.
In short, this is a cabinet that, as a group, reflects a tilt toward strategic autonomy at a time when regional allies are hardening their defense postures. Without internal diversity in threat assessments, what happens if Lee’s administration becomes a policy echo chamber—prioritizing optimism over realism in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific environment?
“We can simply say ‘xie xie’ [‘thank you’] to both China and Taiwan, and avoid taking sides in their dispute.” – Lee Jae-myung
But there is more: this administration’s ambiguous stance on the Taiwan Strait.
President Lee explicitly signaled this hedging during the 2024 campaign, stating, “We can simply say ‘xie xie’ [‘thank you’] to both China and Taiwan, and avoid taking sides in their dispute.”
Quite a statement, when talking about a region increasingly viewed as a litmus test for global democratic solidarity.
Lee has since defended this approach, emphasizing pragmatism and national interest over ideological alignment. He has further avoided overt criticism of China’s militarization and has declined to join U.S.-led deterrence initiatives.
A Precarious Balancing Act
As far as we can see, his rationale is rooted in economic pragmatism: maintaining stable trade with China—South Korea’s largest trading partner—and fostering a “peace economy” in the region.
But this hedging comes at a cost. In Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, and New Delhi, doubts are mounting over South Korea’s reliability as a strategic partner.
By appearing non-committal on Taiwan, Lee risks alienating allies who see the defense of democratic norms in the Indo Pacific as paramount. Worse, this gives Beijing a reason to see Seoul as acquiescent—and yet another excuse to feel emboldened in its coercive diplomacy and destabilizing of regional security.
The $5 Million Scandal
And then, there is the corruption scandal.
Compounding these concerns, Lee’s corruption case casts a long shadow over his foreign policy credibility. As governor of Gyeonggi Province, Lee was linked to a clandestine $5 million transfer to North Korea—an act that breached UN sanctions and South Korean law. The funds were allegedly sent to arrange a summit with Kim Jong-un, raising alarms about backchannel diplomacy that bypasses institutional checks and balances.
Though his Vice Governor was convicted for the money transfer, President Lee himself remains under legal scrutiny, although his electoral victory has stalled judicial proceedings.
But it has an impact on foreign policy: the scandal shows a man willing to skirt international law in pursuit of political optics. If this were to be confirmed, it would seriously erode public trust and expose South Korea to reputational risks.
Strategic Fallout and Regional Signaling
This is not just about South Korea: the implications of Lee’s two-handed diplomacy reverberate beyond its borders.
The recalibration toward a more equidistant foreign policy is risky because it can be perceived by allies as either drift or ambiguity. And if this is how allies see it, it will prompt them to reconsider the depth of their security guarantees. In particular, Tokyo and Washington are unlikely to view with equanimity a Seoul that leans toward Beijing while avoiding firm positions on Taiwan.
And that’s not speculation—we already see signs of it.
For example, trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States—revitalized under President Yoon’s administration—is showing signs of stress. Seoul’s reticence to align clearly with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy or condemn North Korean provocations can unravel hard-won gains in security integration and intelligence sharing.
Furthermore, in a region increasingly defined by blocs and security pacts—such as AUKUS and the Quad—strategic ambiguity can lead to exclusion and isolation.
Toward Transparency and Strategic Clarity
Lee’s administration faces a critical juncture.
If he wants to take a dual-track approach of pragmatic engagement and alliance maintenance, then he must underpin it with transparency, conditionality, and a reaffirmation of South Korea’s democratic commitments. Engagement should not mean accommodation; dialogue with Pyongyang and Beijing must proceed with caution and be anchored in verifiable steps toward denuclearization and regional de-escalation.
Equally important is restoring trust with allies. Clear signaling—both rhetorically and operationally—on the Taiwan Strait, North Korea’s weapons program, and alliance commitments will be essential. South Korea’s foreign policy must not only adapt to a multipolar world but also reinforce the liberal international order on which its own prosperity depends.
The pending trial over the $5 million scandal presents an opportunity to reassert legal norms and restore institutional integrity. Failure to pursue accountability risks normalizing backroom deals and eroding the rule of law.
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President Lee’s foreign policy reflects an ambition to transcend binary Cold War logic and position South Korea as a middle power with agency in a multipolar world.
Why not? But such an ambition must not come at the cost of coherence.
The “two-handed” approach—if it is to succeed—requires more than personnel reshuffles and rhetorical balance. It demands strategic clarity, ethical leadership, and steadfast alignment with democratic allies.
There is a lot in the balance: it’s about whether Seoul remains a linchpin in the liberal alliance system or becomes a cautionary tale of strategic ambivalence in an era of renewed great power competition.
And of course, there is more than South Korea. The decisions made by President Lee’s administration will shape not just his country’s trajectory, but the future of the Indo-Pacific order.
