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India knows China can’t take Taiwan

Indian naval officers (credit: Pramod Tiwari)

The Taiwan straits is far from India, but we look at it.

The sea separating China and Taiwan is deceptively narrow—barely 130 kilometres at its widest—but beneath the waves lies a logistical nightmare capable of transforming any ambitious invasion into China’s strategic catastrophe.

Beijing seems invincible to many, but not to New Dehli. Well-informed on their powerful neighbours, Indian analysts and defence professionals have a much more nuanced view on China’s capabilities against Taiwan. On paper, Beijing’s military is impressive, but wars are rarely won by sheer numbers alone, especially when nature, geography, and a fiercely determined enemy conspire against you.

Troubled Waters and Narrow Windows

And if India has the world’s highest mountain range in the world to act as a great wall, Taiwan has an incredible natural moat around it.

The Taiwan straits is a formidable barrier. For a start, crossing it requires perfect timing. Only two short windows each year—April and October—provide conditions calm enough for a massive crossing. Even then, the waters of the Taiwan Strait churn unpredictably, plagued by strong currents and sudden storms capable of capsizing heavily loaded transport vessels.

These logistical nightmares make an invasion highly perilous before the first soldier even reaches Taiwanese shores. China would need to ferry hundreds of thousands of troops and millions of tonnes of equipment across this hostile stretch of sea, relying heavily on civilian ferries and barges ill-suited for combat. Such vessels, slow and unprotected, present tantalising targets for Taiwan’s missiles, mines, submarines, and drones.

Taiwan’s “Kill Zone”

But there is more. The geographical challenge is well-known. What our observers detect is much more specific: let’s take our first look into the hardware…

Taiwan has transformed the strait into a lethal gauntlet bristling with missiles. Over 1,200 anti-ship missiles—subsonic Hsiung Feng-II, supersonic Hsiung Feng-III, and American-made Harpoons—stand ready to unleash devastation on approaching Chinese fleets. Hidden along rugged coastlines and rapidly redeployed after firing, mobile launchers ensure survivability and continuous firepower.

These missiles, capable of sinking ships long before they approach the shore, are strategically deployed in overlapping arcs, creating a dense “kill zone.” This lethal area denial strategy means that any attempt by China to cross the strait would come at staggering human and material costs. Military analysts have repeatedly warned that Taiwan’s anti-ship missile arsenal alone could render the crossing virtually suicidal.

Fortress Beaches and Port Defences

But if some Chinese troops miraculously breach this deadly maritime gauntlet, they’d face an even more formidable obstacle ashore: Taiwan’s beaches themselves. Only a few sites along Taiwan’s west coast, dubbed “Red Beaches,” are even remotely suitable for landing heavy equipment and armour. These areas have been transformed into fortresses layered with mines, anti-landing spikes, barriers, and rapid-deployment obstacles.

Even securing these beaches would yield little advantage.

China desperately needs Taiwan’s ports intact to offload heavy armour, fuel, ammunition, and logistical support. Anticipating this, Taiwanese defence planners have explicitly prepared to sabotage or destroy these port facilities. Without functioning ports, invading troops would quickly become stranded and cut off from vital supplies and reinforcements.

Mountains, Cities, and the Fight Within

Taiwan’s rugged terrain and dense urban centres form natural choke points where invading forces can be trapped, encircled, and slowly worn down. Taiwanese soldiers are trained to fight from concealed and fortified positions in mountain passes and urban labyrinths. Get ready for a long, bloody, and politically untenable battle.

Taiwan’s defence plans explicitly rely on a decentralised resistance strategy. Even if Chinese forces establish beachheads, defenders will withdraw to mountain strongholds and city fortifications, drawing attackers into brutal, prolonged battles—something modern China, obsessed with quick and decisive victories, deeply fears.

American Missiles and Taiwan’s Defensive Shield

But again, all this is geography. Let’s make our second dive into hardware.

Advanced U.S. missile systems enhance Taiwan’s formidable defences and add devastating depth to its military capabilities. Systems like the Patriot PAC-3 MSE and NASAMS significantly bolster Taiwan’s air defences, able to intercept Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles at altitudes up to 60 kilometres and ranges up to 60 kilometres—doubling the performance of previous systems.

These missile batteries are potent and integrated into Taiwan’s broader defence architecture, providing a multi-layered shield. The PAC-3’s hit-to-kill precision means incoming threats would explode harmlessly in mid-air, minimising collateral damage even in overpopulated urban areas. Coupled with U.S.-supplied HIMARS and ATACMS missiles, Taiwan now holds strategic strike capabilities capable of targeting Chinese staging areas across the strait.

The CCP’s Existential Crisis

For China’s Communist Party, the political stakes are equally dire. An invasion attempt gone wrong means the end President Xi Jinping’s carefully cultivated image of infallibility and national rejuvenation. Military setbacks, massive casualties, economic collapse, and international isolation are the perfect breeding ground for domestic unrest, and elite dissent, and even threaten the CCP’s grip on power.

And the economic backlash is a real risk. Let’s ignore the analysts who keep predicting China’s economic collapse, and focus instead on what a protacted conflict means for the Chinese economy: Estimates suggest China’s economy could shrink by up to 9% within a year of an invasion, eclipsing the economic devastation experienced by Russia following its aggression against Ukraine. Taiwan produces nearly 60% of the world’s semiconductors—critical components for everything from smartphones to advanced weaponry, all of it jeopardised by the avalanche of sactions and embargoes that follow an invasion. And that’s not accounting for those partners – such as signatories of the Belt and Road Initiative – whose “friendship” is not going to survive the test of such a crisis: what happens when a chunk of previously reliable partners decide to step away from Beijing to avoid being trapped in sanctions?

Historically, failed invasions have toppled empires; a disastrous campaign against Taiwan could similarly shake the very foundations of Xi’s China.

Taiwan’s Will to Fight

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, stands the unbreakable will of Taiwan’s people. Polls consistently show overwhelming determination among Taiwanese citizens to defend their homeland. Increasingly, Taiwanese society identifies itself as distinctively Taiwanese—not Chinese—and has little interest in reunification by force or coercion.

Taiwan is a formidable adversary—not just militarily but psychologically. China is confronting a unified population that is determined and ready to endure hardship for freedom, an intangible but powerful advantage often overlooked by strategic planners. All recent developments, from the recall campaign to protests, show the Taiwanese population is not a pushover

The Invasion China Cannot Afford

An amphibious invasion of Taiwan is an act of strategic self-destruction. Logistically impossible, militarily disastrous, economically ruinous, and politically catastrophic, the supposed “reunification” of Taiwan through force would ultimately leave China weaker, isolated, and potentially unstable.

India is constantly scrutinising China. Viewed from here, it is clear that, far from achieving the CCP’s dream of national rejuvenation, an assault on Taiwan could trigger the exact opposite: a devastating defeat from which Beijing will never fully recover.

Aritra Banerjee: Aritra Banerjee is a Defence, Foreign Affairs & Aerospace Journalist, Co-Author of the book 'The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage' and was the Co-Founder of Mission Victory India (MVI), a new-age military reforms think-tank. He has worked in TV, Print and Digital media, and has been a columnist writing on strategic affairs for national and international publications. His reporting career has seen him covering major Security and Aviation events in Europe and travelling across Kashmir conflict zones. Twitter: @Aritrabanned
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